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COMMENT: GOVERNING ALLIANCES:
ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND
CONTROLLING OPPORTUNISM
Susan R. Helper
t
I want to do a couple of things. First, I would like to com-
ment on Professor Rachelle Sampson's paper' in the context of the
broad agenda for research that she has laid out and made a lot of
strides in carrying forward. Then, I would also like to discuss
some of the issues she has raised, but in a somewhat different con-
text.
I will begin with my comments on Rachelle's paper. To sum-
marize her findings: if the hazards are low, then firms should
govern R & D with contracts instead of joint ventures in order to
reduce bureaucratic costs. However, if they make a mistake and
2
choose joint ventures, firms will receive fewer patents.
When Rachelle analyzes this, she looks at the factors that
would increase the hazards. 3 If you have more partners, the rela-
tionship is going to be more difficult to govern. Other examples of
factors that would increase the hazards would be: (1) Having mul-
tiple purposes beyond R & D, such as manufacturing, manage-
ment, et cetera; (2) Having weak legal protection (in an interna-
tional context, for example); and (3) The alliance's broad scope -
i.e., Is the alliance trying to develop the next generation of prod-
ucts, or is it a minor extension?
So, the main finding is that firms that choose the joint venture
when hazards are low get substantially fewer patents. I have not
had the chance to study the papers thoroughly, thus, my comments
are somewhat limited.
4Rachelle has discussed nontraditional means of governance.I think her work here is a real contribution; these mechanisms are
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understudied, given their importance in practice. What I want to
do is raise some questions about the causality. What she finds is
that most firms actually do choose governance according to the
prescriptions of transaction cost theory. There is a problem when
it looks like firms are making mistakes. What we do not know is
whether the firm is making a mistake, or whether a firm has differ-
ent, and hard-to-discover objectives and constraints. One issue
may be that a technically difficult project might have both a great
potential for unforeseen problems, so that the firm would choose a
joint venture, and a low probability of payoff, so that the firm does
not receive very many patents. If these factors combine, choosing
the joint venture might actually be the correct decision, and the
project is just a tough one.
Rachelle makes some attempts to control for this. However,
the next generation versus a minor improvement variable, while
controlling for the scope of the project, may not capture the kind
of technical difficulty to which I am referring.
A second issue is one that raises broader issues about transac-
tion cost theory. The firms may have other goals from the
collaboration besides maximizing their total patents. One issue
may be that what they really want is to get rent or profits from the
patents and therefore, they are willing to take a somewhat less
efficient overall form of governance if it offers them better control
rights. The second issue, therefore, is understanding the details of
these agreements and whether contracts or joint ventures have
systematically different outcomes or different abilities for firms to
control the outcome of the research project.
A third issue, which is also fundamental in transaction cost
analysis, is determining the attributes of a transaction. In transac-
tion cost literature, the authors assume that the attributes of a
transaction are fixed. It is either a high hazard transaction or a low
hazard transaction. Once these attributes are given, agents then
decide how they are going to govern it. What sometimes happens
in practice, however, is that the sequence goes the other way
around. There is a structure that the parties like; maybe they like
joint ventures, and they choose the attributes of the transaction to
go with that. Or maybe there is a party that you do not trust too
much so you design an R & D project that can be governed by a
contract.
Alternatively, the agents can choose the governance and the
transaction attributes jointly. I suggest that concerns about appro-
priability as well as efficiency determine how a party structures the
[Vol. 53:929
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transaction. I will give some examples from my own work that
may be useful here.
I also want to discuss other kinds of relationship features that
can mitigate this problem of opportunism, or of people taking
advantage of each other. Some of this is joint work with John Paul
MacDuffie, who is trained as a sociologist, and Chuck Sabel, who
teaches at a law school, although he is not a lawyer. We noticed
that we actually saw a great deal of collaboration among firms de-
spite the fact that it often seems pretty risky. One of the things
that both lawyers and economists share is that we are very risk
averse; we pay a lot of attention to the hazards of opportunism.
However, one thing that lawyers and economists do not value
enough, and that business people may value more, is the
opportunities for learning.
Now, I want to discuss some mechanisms that, in practice
sometimes allow firms to have the best of both worlds - to both
learn about new ways of doing things, and to avoid being victims
of opportunism. What I want to discuss is some data from the
automotive industry, and switch the context from R & D in the
telecommunications industry, to part design and manufacturing in
the automobile industry. I believe that there is more similarity
than what meets the eye. The thing that makes both R & D and
product design difficult, from the theoretical point of view, is that
(a) these projects involve a lot of uncertainty and (b) large
amounts of money are involved. We are talking about big plants
with hundreds of engineers involved for a part development pro-
ject, with very few contractual restrictions. What happens to the
design expenditures if the project fails?
For example, in one case, a supplier company had invested
several million dollars in a product design effort with Chrysler for
a new minivan in Europe. There was an unforeseen problem, and
the minivan was never introduced because it became clear from a
marketing point of view that it had to have sliding doors on both
sides. This particular minivan was designed without that feature.
Chrysler decided to forget the project. They were not going to in-
troduce the new minivan, and the supplier company ended up eat-
ing that million-dollar expenditure that they had already put into
the project. The number of sliding doors was not a contingency
that was foreseen when they designed the contracts, so there was
no protection in it. Thus, product design has some surprisingly
similar attributes to R & D projects, in that in both cases we are
talking about a great deal of money, and we are also talking about
contracts that are incomplete, and not fully specified.
2003]
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Joint product developments between a supplier and a cus-
tomer appear dangerous, from both a legal and economic point of
view; yet, they are quite common. According to survey data I col-
lected in 1993, you actually see almost as much joint product de-
velopment done in non-vertically integrated cases as in vertically
integrated cases. You can think of vertically integrated govern-
ance as having similar costs and benefits as the joint venture. In
both arrangements there is a common management structure. You
also have a similar set of bureaucratic structures.
Another arrangement that is problematic from a transaction-
cost point of view is that of the resident engineer, which occurs
when a supplier sends one of its engineers to live at the manufac-
turing plant of its customer. It is problematic in that it is unclear
what this person's duties are. The supplier pays for the resident
engineer, but often the assembler ends up directing him, telling
him what to do. Again, these things are surprisingly common.
What makes this work? I want to suggest some of the mecha-
nisms that were evolved most systematically by Japanese manufac-
turers, especially Toyota and Honda. We have seen a lot of em-
phasis in the business literature on how these mechanisms - which
we call "pragmatic mechanisms" - promote learning. Total quality
management, such as "just-in-time," are systems that allow you to
learn about the process, allow you to manufacture with a greater
degree of efficiency.
These mechanisms also have an unforeseen effect in aligning
incentives. Thus, they have a governance side as well as a prob-
lem solving side. I want to give you a couple of examples of how
this works from a study that I did at Honda.
One of the very interesting things during the period, from
1992-1995, that we were working at Honda, was that two of
Honda's three U.S. plants were run by lawyers. It is, perhaps, the
world's only case of lawyers becoming plant managers.
What are these mechanisms? One of them is bench marking.
Often there is a problem in managing where it is difficult to tell
when something does not happen (for example, a quality problem
was not solved), and you do not know if it was because your part-
ner was lazy or because there were circumstances not under your
partner's control. Bench marking allows you to see what the par-
ties should be able to do. If you do this jointly, you can reduce
that level of information asymmetry.
The second technique is something called the "Five Whys,"
which is an incredibly useful technique. For example, start with a
problem of a machine that is not working. Why is the machine not
[Vol. 53:929
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working? The machine is not working because it overheats. Why
does it overheat? We did not do any preventive maintenance on it.
Why did we not do any preventative maintenance? Because the
engineers are always working on some other machine. Why are
they always working on the other machine? Because that machine
gets dripped on by a water leak in the roof.
Instead of replacing a very expensive machine, the use of this
technique leads us to fix the roof, which might be cheaper. This
example is made up, but it does show how using the "Five Whys"
allows you to search in ways that are totally unexpected. You fo-
cus on Machine A, and it turns out the problem has to do with the
roof over Machine B. This example lays out another issue with the
theories that both economists and lawyers often use: that we as-
sume we know how to specify the problem in advance.
Economists and lawyers often use principal/agent analysis in
thinking about how to organize transactions. A fundamental as-
sumption of this analysis is that the principal knows what she
wants the agent to do and just has to design a contract that gives
them the incentives to do it. In contrast, the outcome in the ma-
chine example above suggests that we may not have a good idea of
what we want agents to do.
Another thing that is happening when we use these pragmatic
mechanisms is that we are advancing learning. However, we are
also, simultaneously, controlling opportunism. One of the ways
this happens is that we are making the information symmetric. For
example in the case of bench marking and in the case of the "Five
Whys," there is a lot of data that is generated that gets exchanged.
I want to give one example involving Honda and a mirror
supplier called Donnelly. You can see from this example that
these mechanisms start very slowly. How does this fit in with
Rachelle's argument? Is the use of these pragmatic mechanisms a
substitute for more formal governance mechanisms, or is it merely
complementing it? I think the dominant effect here is one of sub-
stitution. Thus, we start out very small.
Honda comes to the U.S. in the early 1980s and builds a mo-
torcycle plant. Then, Donnelly provides mirrors for them. It is not
a huge investment on either side, but they like each other. One of
the things that they are doing as they go on with this venture is
determining the trustworthiness of their counterparts. How does
this happen? From Donnelly's point of view, Honda is an un-
known Japanese manufacturer who comes over and wants to do
things totally differently. Donnelly has always thought of them-
selves as very good at manufacturing, but Honda thinks their
20031
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plants are terrible. Much of the difference in opinion is due to a
different philosophy - Donnelly produces in large batches, while
Honda believes more in "Just-in-Time." To resolve the issue,
Honda comes in to Donnelly's plant and provides an initial gift of
several hundred thousand dollars' worth of technical assistance.
This helps Donnelly realize that Honda is both a competent partner
and that they are also trustworthy. Simultaneously, Honda is wor-
rying about Donnelly. Honda is trying to figure out whether the
reason that Donnelly is not performing to the Honda standard is
that they are either: (a) incompetent or (b) opportunistic. Gradu-
ally, through the data, such as quality data, that they generate, they
are able to decide that Donnelly was a pretty good partner. We
then see the investments escalating.
One of the key events occurred in 1989. Donnelly had not yet
made any profit on its investment in this relationship with Honda
and yet, Honda came and said, "We want you to build an auto-
mated paint line. We want you to spend five million dollars."
Donnelly had never painted anything before, but Honda had a fo-
cus group that said, "We would like the outside mirrors to match
the color of our cars."
I asked the people involved to describe the governance proc-
ess used to determine whether Donnelly would make the invest-
ment. It consisted of dinner between Donnelly and the purchasing
manager at Honda, Dave Nelson. The Donnelly people described
it as follows: "Well, when we looked into Dave Nelson's eyes, we
decided we could trust this man.". Of course, it was not quite that
simple because there was already seven years of a history, of a re-
lationship. One of the things that Honda was also doing was help-
ing Donnelly with its other customers: "Anything that is a distrac-
tion to Donnelly, is a problem for us."
So, when Donnelly had a problem with its Chrysler business,
Honda helped them work on it. The outcome is that Donnelly ends
up with a whole set of business in exterior mirrors that they never
had before. This was about twenty-five percent of their business
in the late 1990s. This was not necessarily an expected outcome
when they entered a relationship to build motorcycle parts in the
early 1980s.
What is going on here? I had a long discussion with the law-
yer, Scott Whitlock, who was the plant manager at Honda at the
time. His view was that the key question was, "Do you trust your
partner?" And that, sometimes, is not a legal decision - it's a
business decision, but if you do trust them, you can then imagine a
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lot of other things happening and a lot of freedom for other oppor-
tunities.
What does this mean about the role of lawyers? One role is
that rather than assuming the worst about one's partner and insist-
ing on clauses in an agreement to cover every contingency, law-
yers could help figure out ways that partners can monitor each
other - design ways of gathering information that can be used to
both advance knowledge and monitor opportunism.
Another role for lawyers is in designing public policies to-
ward R & D. Lawyers here could think of their role as designing
incentive systems that promote social welfare. In the case of R &
D, there is a trade off between wanting people to work hard to dis-
cover new ideas and avoiding duplication of effort. We do not
want different groups of people working hard to find out the same
thing twice. Given this tradeoff, how should we design laws about
intellectual property? Paradoxically, we might find that it is better,
both from a social and a private perspective, to have less intellec-
tual property protection rather than more. For example, one of the
things that makes Silicon Valley successful is that people are quite
willing to share information about how to solve problems, even if
there is no formal alliance structure. As a result, there is much less
duplication of efforts, and progress can be very fast because people
are not taking time to work out all of the legal details.
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